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Turning the Page?

The Mugabe Era: A Postmortem

Sara Rich Dorman

A Chance for Renewal in South Africa

Xolela Mangcu

Burning Bridges

Cameroon's Language Woes

Eric A. Anchimbe

Kenya's Election Fiasco

K. Ochieng' Opalo

Plus:

The EU's Migration Missteps

Nicole Hirt

Chinese Capital in Zambia

Scott D. Taylor

Climate Adaptation in a Dry Land

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CURRENT HISTORY

May 2018

Vol. 117, No. 799

CONTENTS

- 163 The End of the Mugabe Era in Zimbabwe** *Sara Rich Dorman*
The nonagenarian strongman who ruled for decades was eased out of the presidency—but his party and its liberation war rhetoric, and many of his key associates, remain dominant.
- 169 The Roots of the Anglophone Problem: Language and Politics in Cameroon** *Eric A. Anchimbe*
A linguistic divide from the age of French and British colonial rule has taken on the form of an ethnic rivalry. Now a crackdown on Anglophone protests may have sparked a secessionist movement.
- 175 European Missteps on African Migration** *Nicole Hirt*
Many of the European Union's efforts to stem the flow of migrants from Africa are empowering the very authoritarian rulers whose policies are compelling so many to head north.
- 181 Climate Adaptation and Water Scarcity in Southern Africa** *Gina Ziervogel*
The Limpopo River Basin and Cape Town illustrate the rural and urban challenges of adapting to climate change in a vulnerable region. *Eighth in a series on climate adaptation around the world.*
- 187 Another Disputed Election Batters Kenya's Institutions** *K. Ochieng' Opalo*
After the Supreme Court overturned the results of a presidential election and the opposition boycotted the do-over, democratic institutions have been tarnished by self-interested politicians.

PERSPECTIVE

- 194 A Fresh Start for South Africa?** *Xolela Mangcu*
Cyril Ramaphosa, the new president, needs to restore public confidence in a ruling party eroded by the corruption associated with his predecessor, Jacob Zuma. Here are some ideas he could try.

BOOKS

- 197 The Nature of Chinese Capital in Africa** *Scott D. Taylor*
A new study of Chinese projects in one African nation offers a nuanced picture of a distinct type of state-led foreign investment often caricatured as a rapacious new form of imperialism.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

- 200 March 2018**
An international chronology of events in March, country by country, day by day.

CURRENT HISTORY

May 2018

“Zimbabwe’s politics continues to be driven by a generation that defines itself in terms of its contribution to the liberation war and remains committed to defending that legacy.”

The End of the Mugabe Era in Zimbabwe

SARA RICH DORMAN

In 1980, Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party came to power after a bitter liberation war against the Rhodesian white settler regime. In the years that followed, they undertook a process of nation- and state-building that was intended to institutionalize the party’s control of the political sphere and ensure its monopoly on political representation in independent Zimbabwe. The country initially prospered under Mugabe, with particular successes in education and health care, but in recent decades the economy had faltered as his rule became increasingly personalized and autocratic. In November 2017, Mugabe was dramatically toppled from power by the army, acting in the name of his party. Although the 94-year-old Mugabe is now distant from the corridors of power, the edifice he constructed still stands, with many of the same players in control, driving forward the same agenda.

For many Zimbabweans, the generals’ seizure of power, followed by the inauguration of former Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa as president, was a welcome relief after months of renewed political and economic instability. For others, Mugabe’s removal itself was a cause for celebration, accomplishing what years of political protest and electoral challenges had failed to do. But it seems unlikely that Zimbabwe’s politics will change very much.

November’s relatively bloodless coup was carefully stage-managed to ensure that the head of state’s replacement appeared legitimate, while also resolving the increasingly fragile situation in the country. In this, the army was successful: it con-

vinced international observers that no intervention was called for and that the transition had a constitutional basis. Although Western leaders were happy to see him go, Mugabe still had support among African leaders who venerated his role in bringing Zimbabwe to independence. Despite the army’s presence on the streets and Mugabe’s evident unwillingness to resign, the eventual transfer of power was accepted as a civilian-led process and rapidly legitimized through the courts.

The coup was not intended to change Zimbabwe’s political trajectory—the plan was to bring it back on course. Calling its intervention “Operation Restore Legacy,” the military effectively played the nationalist card, signaling its loyalty to the ethos of the liberation war and reminding citizens of its own contributions to the making of the nation. This virtue signaling was aimed partly at the international audience; it was also meant for Zimbabweans, many of whom had never known another leader. While desperate for political change, they still wanted to see their longtime president treated with dignity.

SUCCESSION STRUGGLE

The unexpected military intervention was the result of Mugabe’s refusal to name a successor, his wife Grace’s increasingly unsubtle grab for power, and the reemergence of money shortages and rising food prices in a return to the hyperinflation of the late 2000s. No one thought Mugabe would retire or hand over power willingly, but his lingering in office into extreme old age risked creating a power vacuum, or, perhaps worse, allowing his much younger wife to construct her own power base. She had made good progress on this project in recent months as she maneuvered for the vice presidency. In early November, the ouster of

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“[T]he intertwined nature of language, politics, and identity permeates the nation, its institutions, and the public and private lives of its citizens.”

The Roots of the Anglophone Problem: Language and Politics in Cameroon

ERIC A. ANCHIMBE

When the wind of independence blew through Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, the choice of an official language for the new nation-states was a tricky one. Some adopted a colonial tongue as the sole official language, as in the case of Ivory Coast with French. Others favored two official languages—one local and one colonial—as Tanzania did with English and Kiswahili. A third approach was to adopt a dual policy, as Nigeria did by recognizing English as its official language and Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba as regional languages. None retained an indigenous language as the sole official language.

A special case of this dilemma was Cameroon, which had undergone a complex colonial experience. The Central African territory had been colonized by Germany from 1884 to 1916 and then, after World War I, partitioned between France and Britain until independence in the early 1960s. All traces of the German language were obliterated by the colonial policies of the French and British. The new independent nation-state opted for a policy of state bilingualism: the two colonial languages, French and English, both became official languages in a federal state consisting of the former French-ruled and British-ruled regions, whose people are now referred to as Francophones and Anglophones, respectively.

It could be argued that this was the only practical decision possible at that time. What's certain is that the policy has since had extensive ramifications not only for language policy implementation but also for citizens' identities. Given the dense multilingual milieu in which they live, Camer-

oonians have to adaptively switch among these two official languages, over 280 indigenous languages, and the Pidgin English widely used for a wide range of functions in different contexts. For instance, Pidgin English is used in political campaigns, community health centers, on the radio, and as a lingua franca in interethnic conversations.

Since 2016, Cameroon has been rocked by the latest and most serious eruption of what was referred to as far back as the 1990s as the “Anglophone Problem.” This time it started relatively timidly, in October 2016, with a peaceful march by Anglophone lawyers to protest the appointment of French-speaking judges trained in French civil law to preside in English-speaking, English common law–based courts in the North West and South West regions. The following month, Anglophone teachers protested against the transfer of monolingual French-speaking teachers to the English-language education subsystem of those regions.

The government's response to these peaceful protests was heavy-handed. Lawyers and teachers were beaten and incarcerated. In response, they went on a strike that shut down the courts and schools. With no signs of cooperation from the government, the protests suddenly metamorphosed into a call for the secession of the two English-speaking regions from the rest of the country. On October 3, 2017, the Anglophone Consortium—a movement that emerged out of the strike actions—symbolically declared the independence of the “Republic of Ambazonia” from the rest of the country.

The government responded to this declaration with a crackdown that has led to hundreds being arrested, many killed, and tens of thousands fleeing to neighboring Nigeria, where a refugee camp has been set up for them. Entire villages have been

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“In the long run, a policy whose main focus is on improving so-called border management in countries that are known to trample human rights and disrespect the rule of law cannot be successful.”

European Missteps on African Migration

NICOLE HIRT

In 2015, Europe experienced an unforeseen surge in the number of incoming refugees, mainly fleeing the civil war in Syria but also from other countries. This had a dramatic effect on public opinion, in part due to intensive media coverage of what was portrayed as “a flood of refugees” storming border fences and moving northward. Although Africans made up only a small percentage of the arrivals, the European Union has since engaged in a multitude of efforts to prevent people from the neighboring continent from reaching Europe by way of Libya. This may be due to latent fears that the rapid growth of Africa’s population and the lack of job opportunities at home will drive growing numbers of illegal migrants toward European shores. But have the measures taken by the EU to curb migration—partly to quell rising right-wing nationalism that feeds on discontent over immigration—been successful or instead counterproductive?

In the early years of the twenty-first century, European policy makers were worried about rising numbers of migrants and refugees from West Africa entering Europe through Spain’s overseas territories. They arrived either by boat in the Canary Islands or on foot in Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish exclaves on African soil bordering Morocco. In response, the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (also known as the Rabat Process) was launched in 2006 with more than 50 participating states. The process is supposed to coordinate action by countries of origin, transit, and destination along the migration routes that connect Central, West, and North Africa with Europe. One of its aims is countering irregular migration, with a focus on border management and return policies. Another goal is to identify the root

causes of migration and to strengthen development initiatives that address them.

Under the Rabat Process, Morocco, as the main transit country on the Spanish route, has been encouraged to play the part of border guard for Europe. Ceuta and Melilla are now heavily fortified, and migrants are exposed to excessive force applied by both Moroccan and Spanish border guards; many have lost their lives while trying to climb the border fences or to reach Spanish shores by boat. Moroccan authorities have arrested large numbers of Africans who tried to circumvent these barriers and deported them to desert areas near the Moroccan-Algerian border.

However, closing down one migration route merely diverted traffic to others. When Italy experienced an increase in arrivals of Africans via Libya, then-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi did not hesitate to reach an agreement with the Libyan dictator Muammar el-Qaddafi. In 2009 they signed what Human Rights Watch called a “dirty deal to enable Italy to dump migrants and asylum seekers on Libya and evade its obligations.”

Italy pledged \$200 million a year for infrastructure projects in its former colony, purportedly as compensation for colonial-era misdeeds. In return, Qaddafi promised to block migration across the Mediterranean from Libya. The border patrols of both countries cooperated on transporting refugees and migrants back to Libya, where they were held in detention centers under inhumane conditions in a nation that was not a party to the United Nations Refugee Convention.

As passage from Africa to Europe through Spain and Italy became increasingly difficult, a new route across Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula to Israel opened up for a limited time for refugees from the Horn of Africa. From 2006 to 2012, it was used by people fleeing Sudan’s civil war and the autocratic regime in Eritrea, which forces its citizens to en-

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“Adaptation is only going to get more challenging as changes in the climate intensify, combining with the effects of rapid urbanization and the persistently high levels of poverty and inequality in Africa.”

Climate Adaptation and Water Scarcity in Southern Africa

GINA ZIERVOGEL

Southern Africa is no stranger to an unpredictable climate. Temperatures and rainfall have always varied dramatically. Increasingly, however, the patterns are shifting. Farmers complain about longer dry spells within the rainy season, urban officials worry about the more frequent occurrence of intense

Changing with the Climate

Eighth in a series

rains that lead to flooding, and everyone grumbles about the number of hot days and nights that make

their homes uncomfortable.

Since the region's climate has always been variable, people and institutions have adapted to its fluctuations in many ways. But these measures alone are proving insufficient as climate change intensifies. Adaptation at scale is needed: nations must take up the challenge alongside cities, businesses, and civil society groups.

Southern Africa is seen as particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change because of its high levels of poverty and inequality and its heavy reliance on natural resources. Water availability and access have a direct impact on agriculture, a sector on which over 70 percent of the population depends. They are central to both the economy and individual livelihoods in the region.

Unfortunately, food production has not kept pace with the region's growing population. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), an intergovernmental organization, is concerned about this trend. As David Lesolle of the University of Botswana wrote in a 2012 SADC policy paper on climate change, the regional population soared

from 152 million to 249 million people between 1990 and 2006, while food production barely budged, increasing from 22 to 24 million tons per year. The population has since risen to 277 million.

Water access at the household level is critical for productive livelihoods. Many homes in Southern Africa still do not have piped-in water, so household members have to get water from standpipes or buy it from vendors. Time spent fetching water could be better spent on other things like going to school or pursuing economic activities. In years when water is especially scarce, these opportunity costs are greater.

Health is also directly affected by water availability and quality. There are concerns that vector-borne diseases will become more prevalent with changes in the climate. Botswana, for example, is likely to face a significant increase in the proportion of the population living in malaria-prone areas by 2021.

As the African continent urbanizes, its cities' water and sewage systems will come under greater pressure. Ensuring the security of the water supply to cities and towns is particularly challenging in semiarid regions with variable climates. Many urban areas have relied on surface water from dams and rivers that are increasingly coming under strain, particularly during years of low rainfall. New approaches to water management, such as urban design that better integrates stormwater infrastructure and sustainable drainage systems, are being explored. But implementation has been slow because of constraints on governments' and contractors' capacity to adopt new approaches and limited resources to pay for them.

The importance of understanding the impact of climate on water has been recognized at the SADC

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“[T]he conflicts surrounding the 2017 elections severely eroded the integrity of democracy in Kenya.”

Another Disputed Election Batters Kenya's Institutions

K. OCHIENG' OPALO

Kenya's 2017 general election exposed the fragility of many of the country's institutions and the persistent salience of ethnicity as the primary organizing principle of national politics. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) proved inadequate to the task of conducting a credible election. The judicial system demonstrated its independence with a shocking annulment of the August 8 presidential election but eventually capitulated to pressure and direct intimidation from the executive branch.

Similarly, it became clear that despite security-sector reforms over the last decade, the Kenya Police Service is still prone to abuse by the executive branch for political ends. Throughout the election year, the police used deadly force with impunity against opposition supporters.

Once again, the election was mainly contested among Kenya's major ethnic groups. The incumbent Jubilee Party is viewed as primarily a Kikuyu-Kalenjin alliance. The National Super Alliance (NASA) is dominated by the Luhya, Luo, Kamba, and Mijikenda.

President Uhuru Kenyatta ran for a second and final term as Jubilee's candidate. In a rematch of the 2013 contest, his leading challenger was former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, NASA's standard-bearer. Kenyans also elected a new National Assembly and Senate, as well as 47 governors and county assemblies at the sub-national level (which were constituted following the 2013 election).

The campaign period saw increased polarization and ethnic balkanization, and the election was marred by widespread violence. A week before the election, the IEBC's chief information technol-

ogy officer was found tortured and murdered, and the opposition alleged that he was the victim of a scheme to rig the vote.

Odinga successfully challenged the result of the presidential election at the Supreme Court, which ordered a new election to be held within 60 days. However, Odinga boycotted the rerun and Kenyatta was reelected on October 26 with 98 percent of the vote, on a paltry turnout of only 39 percent. He was sworn in for a second term on November 28.

The period between the two elections saw widespread street protests that were met by excessive police force. According to Human Rights Watch, at least 104 people were killed during the election cycle, nearly all of them by the police. The vast majority of these victims died from wounds caused by high-caliber rifle shots at close range. Many of them were opposition supporters, concentrated in pro-NASA informal settlements in Nairobi, the capital; Kisumu, the country's third-largest city; and Kakamega, a town north of Kisumu in western Kenya.

Overall, the events of 2017 pushed Kenya in the direction of a creeping electoral authoritarianism, albeit in the face of pushback from the courts, civil society organizations, and the opposition. Normal institutional checks on executive power—principally through the legislature and the courts—appeared unable to deter or sanction executive actions that were plainly contrary to the rule of law. Dependence on the government for advertising revenue continued to hobble the media's ability to hold the executive to account.

Perhaps the silver lining from the 2017 electoral cycle was voters' willingness to ditch poorly performing governors at the county level. The general election was the second under the 2010 constitution, which created 47 county governments with elected executives and assemblies, replacing eight

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A Fresh Start for South Africa?

XOLELA MANGCU

In my book *The Arrogance of Power: South Africa's Leadership Meltdown*, published four years ago, I argued that the crisis of leadership in the country's ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), ran deeper than President Jacob Zuma's corruption. Too easily we forget how controversial Zuma's predecessor Thabo Mbeki was, especially over his denial that HIV is the cause of AIDS. Criminal charges recently reinstated against Zuma after his resignation under pressure this February have their origins in an infamously corrupt arms deal that was concluded during the presidency of Nelson Mandela in a process overseen by Mbeki. In that deal, the South African government purchased arms the country did not need for billions of rands in order to line the pockets of the party's senior officials.

Since Mandela's departure from office in 1999, his successors have slowly been eating away at South Africans' trust and goodwill. This resulted in a decline in the ANC's electoral majority from 70 percent at the height of Mbeki's popularity in 2004 to 62 percent under Zuma in 2014. In the 2016 local government elections, the ANC lost control of the major cities, including the country's economic engine, Johannesburg. It was almost a foregone conclusion that the party would sink even lower in the polls if it went into the 2019 general election with Zuma at the head of its ticket. The ANC's action to replace Zuma as president before his term was up reflected those fears.

The question now is whether the new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, can restore the people's trust in the party after the damage of the Zuma years. This question is complicated by the fact that the ANC's rank and file voted to surround Ramaphosa with some of Zuma's staunchest backers—including the controversial strongman of Mpumalanga province, David Mabuza, as deputy president and Ace Magashule, premier of Free State province, in the powerful position of the party's secretary-general.

Magashule was accused of graft after the Free State government granted an allegedly corrupt contract to one of the sprawling businesses of the Guptas—an Indian-born family that allegedly had Zuma in their pocket to the extent that their influence was often described as “state capture.”

The presence of these individuals on the ANC's new leadership team has sent all the wrong signals to an already jaded electorate. Also, the party may yet be punished for failing to elect an African woman to any of its highest leadership positions, the so-called top six. The posts of party president, deputy president, chairman, secretary-general, and treasurer are all held by African men. The only woman among them, Jessie Duarte, who is colored (of mixed race), holds the position of deputy secretary-general and is a strong Zuma ally.

Meanwhile, the opposition parties, especially the radical Economic Freedom Front, continue to draw attention to Ramaphosa's role in the August 2012 shooting of striking miners in Marikana, at a mine run by the Lonmin company. As a shareholder in Lonmin, Ramaphosa had called the minister of police asking for an intervention to end what he considered to be criminal conduct by the miners. When the police opened fire, 34 miners were killed.

But South Africans know that Ramaphosa did not call the police to demand that they shoot at the miners—otherwise he would not even have been elected president of the ANC. He is still a very popular figure, thanks to his years as leader of the biggest trade union in the country, the National Union of Mineworkers, in the 1980s and the role he played in the negotiations to end apartheid, working side by side with Nelson Mandela. By all accounts, Mandela preferred Ramaphosa as his successor over Thabo Mbeki, but was overruled by the leadership of the party and by leaders of other African countries. No one is likely to fill Mandela's shoes any time soon, but Ramaphosa is heralded as an approximation of Mandela's celebrated era—the period before Mbeki and Zuma.

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The Nature of Chinese Capital in Africa

SCOTT D. TAYLOR

Barely a decade ago and four years before he was elected president of Zambia, Michael Sata spoke for many when he delivered a searing attack on the Chinese presence in his country and in Africa as a whole. Although enthusiasm for China's role as a "South-South" investor was initially high, by the mid-2000s many analysts shared the unforgiving assessment offered by Sata in a paper presented to the Harvard University Committee on Human Rights Studies in October 2007. He wrote:

Zambia's experience with Chinese investment is much closer to Africa's experience during the mercantilist period, which culminated in the enslavement of its people. European colonial exploitation in comparison to Chinese exploitation appears more benign, because even though the commercial exploitation was just as bad, the colonial agents also invested in social and economic infrastructure and services . . . Chinese investment, on the other hand, is focused on taking out of Africa as much as can be taken out, without any regard to the welfare of the local people. . . . Just as the Africans rejected European exploitation, oppression, and dehumanization, there is no doubt that Chinese exploitation and domination will be rejected too.

As China became a formidable presence in Africa, Zambia was often regarded as ground zero for anti-Chinese sentiment as a result of several highly publicized incidents in which Chinese-owned firms displayed what appeared to be indifference, and Chinese managers seemed at best tone-deaf, and at worst racist, toward their African workers if not the entire populace. Time has not healed all the wounds, but the image and reality of "China in Africa" have become far more nuanced since then.

In his 2007 paper, Sata struck a populist chord just two years after a deadly blast at an explosives

factory partly owned by the Chinese state killed nearly 50 Zambian workers. Of course, many non-Africans have also sounded the alarm about the growing Chinese presence in Africa. Human Rights Watch, for example, slammed Chinese labor practices in a November 2011 report. On a trip to Africa that year, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton decried what she called a "new colonialism" spread by Chinese state interests that "take out natural resources, pay off leaders, and leave."

Yet African popular attitudes toward China are—and probably always were—considerably less hostile than the rhetoric suggests. For some time, various surveys of public opinion in Africa have demonstrated that views of China are positive overall, consistent with Africans' perceptions of former colonial powers and, frequently, the United States. Polls in an array of countries have also shown that Africans value the importance of economic relations with China and have favorable views of the Chinese on fairness in trade and a host of other measures. In a 2016 Afrobarometer survey of public opinion in 36 African countries, for example, 63 percent of respondents overall said China was a "somewhat" or "very" positive economic and political influence in their country, owing substantially to China's investment in infrastructure and development, as well as the low cost of Chinese products.

Although the results were not entirely rosy—some 35 percent of respondents complained about the poor quality of Chinese-made products, and 14 percent believed that the Chinese take jobs or business from locals—China's role in Africa is dynamic, and decidedly more complex than the caricature implies. Some of the clearest evidence of this was provided by Sata himself. His views softened considerably over time. Indeed, only days after his election to the presidency in 2011, he welcomed a Chinese delegation as his first international guests at State House, the office of the president in Lusaka.

The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa
by Ching Kwan Lee
University of Chicago Press, 2017